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A HOUSE OF CARDS FALLS:
WHY “TOO BIG TO DEBAR” IS ALL SLOGAN
AND LITTLE SUBSTANCE
Jessica Tillipman*
“The serious nature of debarment and suspension requires that these
sanctions be imposed only in the public interest for the Government’s
protection and not for purposes of punishment.” 1

Experts in government procurement were disappointed to read FCPA
Sanctions: Too Big to Debar 2 by Drury D. Stevenson and Nicholas J.
Wagoner. Despite its populist appeal, the article’s fundamental premise is
legally and factually wrong. In the past decade, as the U.S. government has
aggressively enforced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 3 (FCPA),
companies of every size in nearly every industry have paid considerably for
their bribery of foreign officials, demonstrating that no company is immune
from potential FCPA liability if they do business abroad. Despite the
FCPA’s widespread impact, the article has declared war on one segment of
the population: large government contractors. The authors argue that the
best way to deter contractors from bribing foreign officials is to debar them
from the procurement system—the corporate equivalent of a death sentence.
If FCPA enforcement has touched every industry, why do the authors
single out large government contractors? Because they can—large
government contractors are not sympathetic characters. Even though nearly
all companies, regardless of their size or line of business are exposed to the
potential misconduct of rogue employees, government contractors are
expected to defy the statistically impossible. While it is reasonable to
expect ethical conduct from companies that receive taxpayer dollars (as the
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government contracts. She has specialized in government procurement law for over a
decade, including serving as a law clerk to the Honorable Lawrence S. Margolis of the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims and practicing in the Government Contracts and White Collar
Criminal Defense and Counseling practice groups of Jenner & Block’s D.C. office. She
thanks her long-time colleague and mentor, Professor Steven L. Schooner, for his invaluable
feedback and support, and Jessica Henson for her vital research and dedication.
1. FAR 9.402(b) (2008) (emphasis added).
2. Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2011).
3. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3
(2006)).
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seemingly limitless Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) already do), 4 it
is not only self-defeating but also unreasonable to demand debarment, 5
simply because it is “far more crippling to a company’s bottom line.” 6
I. DEBARMENT IS FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S PROTECTION,
NOT PUNISHMENT
To experienced government procurement practitioners, one of the most
glaring errors in Too Big to Debar is its fundamentally flawed
characterization of debarment as a punitive regime. Indeed, at least a third
of the article’s text is devoted to theories of punishment. To understand
why this issue undermines the thesis of the article, a brief overview of the
FAR is warranted.
As FAR 9.4 makes clear, the government is required to use
administrative suspension and debarment “only in the public interest for the
Government’s protection,” to ensure that the government contracts with
“responsible” partners. 7 Debarment may last for up to three years,8 and
may be as broad or as limited as the government deems necessary to protect
its interests, ranging from the debarment of the entire company to the
debarment of a division, facility, or even a single individual.9 Notably,
because the system is not designed to punish contractors, debarment only
applies to future contracts, task orders, and options to extend current
contracts—it does not impact existing contract work with the government. 10
As the authors aptly demonstrate, an important but frequently
misunderstood aspect of the debarment regime is that debarment is to be
used only for the purpose of protecting the government, not to punish past
misconduct. 11 As the FAR clearly states, “The serious nature of debarment
and suspension requires that these sanctions be imposed only in the public
interest for the Government’s protection and not for purposes of
punishment.” 12 This fundamental distinction is crucial to understanding
how the process works and why certain debarment determinations are
4. See Jessica Tillipman, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act & Government
Contractors: Compliance Trends & Collateral Consequences, BRIEFING PAPERS, Aug. 2011,
at 18 n.2 (“The Federal Acquisition Regulations System, consisting of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and agency supplemental acquisition regulations, is a robust set of
rules and requirements governing the U.S. Government’s procurement process.”).
5. For purposes of brevity, the use of the term “debarment” will hereinafter signify both
“debarment” and “suspension,” unless otherwise indicated.
6. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 805.
7. FAR 9.402(a), (b). FAR 9.104-1 outlines the standards used to determine whether
prospective contractors and subcontractors are responsible.
8. Contrary to the article’s claim that debarments last for a “standard two-year period,”
see Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 778, 820, FAR 9.406-4(a)(1) expressly states
that debarment should not exceed three years, see FAR 9.406-4(a)(1). The origin of this
“standard two-year period” is unknown.
9. See FAR 9.406-1(b); see also Tillipman, supra note 4, at 9.
10. See FAR 9.405-1.
11. See FAR 9.402(b) (“Agencies shall impose debarment or suspension to protect the
Government’s interest and only for the causes and in accordance with the procedures set
forth in this subpart.”).
12. Id. (emphasis added).
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made. Fines and incarceration are prosecutors’ tools. Debarment is not a
tool of punishment and, therefore, remains wholly independent of the
criminal justice system. It is an administrative remedy that permits
agencies to exclude contractors from the federal procurement system only
to protect the government from imminent harm.
Again, debarment is not an additional layer of punishment. This is a
crucial distinction emphasized by the plain language of the FAR, which
warns that “[t]he existence of a cause for debarment . . . does not
necessarily require that the contractor be debarred.” 13 In other words, even
if there are potential grounds to debar a contractor because of past
misconduct, Suspension and Debarment Officials (SDOs) should not do so
until they have considered “any remedial measures or mitigating factors”
that may shed light on whether the contractor is presently responsible.14
Indeed, “where a contractor is determined to be presently responsible
despite past misconduct, it presents no threat to the government’s interests,
making debarment inappropriate.” 15
Although the authors briefly mention the FAR’s prohibition against using
debarment to punish contractors, 16 their article completely disregards this
fundamental tenet of the regime (and the regulation’s plain language) by
repeatedly referring to debarment as punishment. The limited courtesy
provided to the actual text of the FAR demonstrates that the authors are
wedded to their own ideas of what the regime should be, than to what it
actually is.
II. BAE SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY IN FLAWED ANALYSIS
Too Big to Debar cites the 2010 FCPA enforcement action against BAE
as evidence that the Department of Justice is somehow improperly
influencing SDOs to refrain from debarring contractors that have allegedly
violated the FCPA. 17 The article contends that the DOJ charged BAE with
conspiracy to make false statements to avoid triggering the FAR’s
“discretionary debarment” authority. 18 This statement defies the plain
language of the regulation. FAR 9.406-2(a)(3) expressly includes “false
statements” as potential grounds for discretionary debarment. 19 Given that
a violation of the false statements statute is an enumerated ground for

13. FAR 9.406-1(a).
14. Id. (providing a list of mitigating factors that a debarment official must consider in
making a debarment determination).
15. Todd J. Canni & Steven A. Shaw, Comments on the Wartime Contracting
Commission’s Recommendations on Suspension and Debarment, SERVICE CONTRACTOR,
Sept. 2011, at 14.
16. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 807.
17. See id. at 798–802.
18. See id. at 800.
19. See FAR 9.406-2(a)(3) (“The debarring official may debar a contractor for a
conviction of or civil judgment for . . . making false statements . . . .”).
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potential debarment, it is utterly confusing (as well as ironic) as to why the
article contains this erroneous statement. 20
One of the more inflammatory and irresponsible statements in the article
is its wholly unsupported claim that the government is “endors[ing]” or
“bankrolling” foreign bribery when it “categorically refus[es] to seriously
consider suspending or debarring companies” that violate the FCPA.21
These statements are demonstrably false. In claiming that the government
never considered debarring BAE, the authors ignore publicly available
information that the Air Force not only fully considered BAE for possible
debarment, but may have positively influenced the company’s interactions
with the DOJ. 22
On October 30, 2009, the Air Force issued BAE’s CEO a “Show Cause
Letter,” nearly five months prior to BAE’s settlement with the DOJ. 23 The
Air Force made clear to BAE that it had serious concerns regarding the
bribery allegations and BAE’s lack of cooperation with the DOJ.24 After
receiving the letter, BAE began cooperating with the government, allowing
the Air Force to conduct investigations into the company’s “processes,
procedures and culture” to ensure its present responsibility, and eventually
pleaded guilty to felony charges and agreed to pay a $400 million fine.25
The documents demonstrate that the Air Force had grounds to debar BAE,
despite the article’s claim to the contrary. 26 Because of the discretion
afforded to SDOs, the Air Force was able “to facilitate further ethical
transformation throughout BAE that [would] benefit all U.S. government
contracts with the company in the future.”27 While BAE’s misconduct was
undeniably egregious, in considering only those facts relating to BAE’s
misconduct, rather than those relating to its remediation and cooperation, it
is not surprising that the authors draw such brazen and inaccurate
conclusions.
20. What makes this statement even more bewildering is that the authors note “false
statements” as grounds for discretionary debarment in other sections of the article. See
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 806, 813 n.271.
21. Id. at 801.
22. See Protecting Taxpayer Dollars: Are Federal Agencies Making Full Use of
Suspension and Debarment Sanctions? Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement
Reform (Oct. 6, 2011) (statement of Steven A. Shaw, Deputy Gen. Counsel (Contractor
Responsibility), Dep’t of the Air Force) [hereinafter Shaw Testimony], available at
http://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111006-094.pdf.
Moreover,
because agencies do not typically inform the public of matters in which they have considered
a company for debarment, but declined to do so, it is equally irresponsible to make such
sweeping, uninformed statements. See generally Canni & Shaw, supra note 15, at 16–17.
23. See Letter from Steven Shaw, Deputy Gen. Counsel (Contractor Responsibility),
Dep’t of the Air Force to Ian King, CEO, BAE Systems plc 1 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter
Shaw Letter], available at http://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110801026.pdf. A “Show Cause Letter” notifies a contractor that it is being considered for
suspension or debarment and affords the opportunity to submit evidence demonstrating that
it is a responsible contractor.
24. See id. at 1.
25. See id.; see also Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 3.
26. See Shaw Letter, supra note 23.
27. See Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 4.

2012]

A HOUSE OF CARDS FALLS

53

Because the article incorrectly views debarment as punishment, it regards
BAE’s post-settlement contract awards as “unfair” and “imprudent.”
Despite the company’s substantial remediation and overhaul of its
compliance organization,28 the authors argue that BAE should have been
banished from the procurement system. Yet, because debarment is the
corporate equivalent of the death penalty, the system is designed not only to
protect the government, but the rights of contractors as well. To agree with
the authors is to ignore an entire regulatory regime and its jurisprudence.
Debarment has the ability to put a company out of business; therefore, the
regime requires an SDO’s careful consideration of mitigating factors, the
company’s present responsibility, and whether the government’s interests
truly need to be protected. In the world of Too Big to Debar, however, a
contractor’s due process rights are irrelevant.
III. THE THREAT OF DEBARMENT IS THE ULTIMATE
“SWORD OF DAMOCLES” 29
Too Big to Debar argues that because large contractors have “virtual
immunity” from debarment, they are not deterred from bribing foreign
officials. In this era of heightened FCPA enforcement, the idea that large
and sophisticated contractors are traveling the world, actively seeking to
bribe foreign officials, belies reality. The government’s recent enforcement
of the FCPA has been extraordinarily aggressive, and is a primary
compliance concern facing most multinational corporations. The costs
associated with investigating and settling FCPA enforcement actions are
astounding. In addition, the government’s focus on individuals has made
violating the FCPA a terrifying prospect. For example, the government
imposed more than $2 billion in criminal fines against individuals between
1998 and 2010. 30 Moreover, the government is increasingly seeking
lengthy jail time for individuals who bribe foreign officials.31 Other
common collateral costs of an FCPA violation include significant
reputational damage, collateral litigation, and substantial blows to a
company’s financial health. 32 As the article acknowledges, “Executives
reportedly spend sleepless nights wondering if their company will be the
next target of an FCPA enforcement action.” 33 If FCPA enforcement costs

28. See Sentencing Memorandum at 11–12, United States v. BAE Sys., No 1:10-cr-035
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
29. See Steven L. Schooner, The Paper Tiger Stirs: Rethinking Suspension and
Debarment, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 211, 214 (2004).
30. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 39 (2010).
31. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Scheme
to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crm-1407.html.
32. See Tillipman, supra note 4, at 14–15.
33. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 783.
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are so substantial that they already keep executives up at night, perhaps
their deterrent value has been underestimated.
In addition to arguing that the current FCPA enforcement regime is not
aggressive enough, the authors suggest that debarring contractors will
somehow stop rogue employees from bribing foreign officials. It is
fundamentally unrealistic (not to mention statistically impossible) to
assume that debarment will prevent employee misconduct in large
multinational companies.34 There is no evidence that any large entity can
be managed, indefinitely, without human transgression.
No matter how sophisticated a company’s internal controls, so long as
they continue to do business in countries where corruption goes
unpunished, the demand for bribes and the pressure to provide them will not
cease. Indeed, after settling the largest FCPA-related enforcement action in
history, Siemens completely “overhauled and greatly expanded its
compliance organization,” and now has hundreds of full-time compliance
personnel worldwide. 35 The DOJ even noted that the “reorganization and
remediation efforts of Siemens have been extraordinary and have set a high
standard for multi-national companies to follow.” 36 Yet, despite its model
compliance program, in October 2011, the media reported that several
Siemens employees made improper payments to Kuwaiti officials—
improper activity that was, incidentally, detected and reported by Siemens’s
new compliance regime. 37 If a company with one of the most extensive
compliance programs in the world cannot fully prevent misconduct, what
company can? Fortunately, even the DOJ recognizes that no company is
immune from misconduct, as Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer
explained: “There will always be rogue employees who decide to take
matters into their own hands. They are a fact of life.” 38 Accordingly,
railing against institutions may be entertaining, but it is neither productive
nor instructive.
IV. BANKRUPT FIRMS CANNOT AFFORD SOPHISTICATED
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Too Big to Debar declares that using debarment more frequently will
encourage greater compliance efforts within a company. However, in
claiming that “a two-year hiatus from all government contracts . . . would
34. For example, Siemens has 336,000 employees in 190 regions around the world,
while BAE has nearly 100,000 employees in over 100 countries. See Siemens Worldwide,
SIEMENS, http://www.siemens.com/about/en/worldwide.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); Key
Facts, BAE SYSTEMS, http://www.baesystems.com/AboutUs/FactSheet/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012).
35. Sentencing Memorandum at 22, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No.
1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008).
36. Id. at 24.
37. Police Investigate Alleged Corruption by Siemens Staff, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 10,
2011), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15146789,00.html.
38. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Corporate Counsel (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110126.html.
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induce more firms to comply with the law,” 39 the authors ignore the reality
of debarment. Debarment often results in the literal end to the existence of
a company. Once a company is debarred, it is wholly excluded from
obtaining new government contracts and subcontracts. 40 In addition, under
certain circumstances, a debarred company’s current contracts may also be
terminated. 41 The debarment of a contractor is also likely to preclude it
from contracting with state and local governments, foreign governments,
and international organizations, such as the World Bank and United
Nations. The reputational damage caused by debarment often harms a
company’s relationship with its commercial partners as well. A debarred
contractor is almost (if not, entirely) starved of future revenue.
It belies reality that a company will be debarred, somehow manage to
survive up to three years on the sidelines, and then expect to come back to
work for the government, stronger and more compliant than ever. Indeed,
“most contractors do not normally spend money improving their
government-contracts related ethics and compliance structures when their
Instead, both FCPA
government revenue streams are cut off.”42
enforcement actions and the administrative suspension and debarment
process provide an “incentive for firms to enter into less draconian
compliance agreements, and then comply with the terms of those
agreements.” 43 This is because the government seeks, through its
enforcement and administrative processes, to influence companies’
compliance with the law—not to put them out of business.
Companies that are spared debarment must agree to a tremendous
overhaul of their compliance systems and internal controls including regular
reporting to the government, third-party monitors, enhanced training for
employees, and ongoing cooperation with the government. 44 By imposing
mandatory debarment, without consideration of a company’s responsibility
or mitigating circumstances, the procurement system “would lose the
opportunity to influence and motivate positive corporate behavior.”45
Moreover, contractors would lack the incentive to work with SDOs “in
proactive, creative ways to benefit the entire government.” 46 Increasing the
number of debarments would not only discourage companies from
continuing to do business with the United States, but would scare off new
entrants to the government marketplace. With a broad menu of criminal
and civil sanctions, plus an aggressive prosecutorial regime, governments
already create enormous barriers to entry that reduce competition for the
government’s business. A more aggressive debarment regime would
further limit the government’s access to the best firms and increase the
taxpayers’ cost for acquiring their services.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 820.
See FAR 9.405(a).
See FAR 9.405-1(a).
Canni & Shaw, supra note 15, at 15.
Schooner, supra note 29, at 214.
Tillipman, supra note 4, at 16–17.
Canni & Shaw, supra note 15, at 17.
Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 5.
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V. “TOO BIG TO DEBAR” IS A SOUND BITE, NOT A REFLECTION OF REALITY
The authors contend that because the government is so dependent on
“favorite” contractors, they are essentially, “too big to debar” and can bribe
foreign officials with “virtual immunity.” In making this claim, the article
ignores every suspension involving a large contractor that has taken place in
the past decade, including Enron,47 Arthur Andersen, 48 MCI Worldcom, 49
several Boeing Launch Systems divisions,50 an L-3 Communications’
Special Support Programs Division, 51 IBM, 52 GTSI, 53 and AED.54 By
presenting severely outdated and one-sided statistics, 55 the article paints a
wholly inaccurate picture of the current debarment regime.
While the article correctly states that large contractors are less likely to
be debarred than their small to mid-sized counterparts, the reasons are not
as nefarious as the authors claim. For example, when misconduct occurs in
huge multinational corporations, the improper activity often involves a
specific division or subset of employees, rather than the entire company.
Thus, in responding to the misconduct, large companies are better
positioned to sever the diseased sector, remediate, implement robust
compliance programs, and move forward. In other words, these companies
are often far better equipped to demonstrate their present responsibility.
Small companies, however, often lack the resources to respond to and
remediate harm and install new and sophisticated compliance programs.
More importantly, because misconduct often permeates the entire firm,
small companies are often unable to terminate the employees responsible
for the misconduct, making full remediation impossible.
In its attack on the debarment regime, the article claims that “officials
shy away from debarring entities that violate the FCPA due to the shortterm inconvenience of an agency’s inability to transact business with its
favorite contractor.” 56 Characterizing the debarment of some of the
government’s largest contractors as an “inconvenience” is laughable. In
certain fields, only one or two contractors have the capability to perform
47. See Dorn McGrath, Misconduct Unrelated to Federal Contracts Could Lead to
DEF.
(May
2005),
Suspension
or
Debarment,
NAT’L
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2005/May/Pages/ethics_corner5770.aspx.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 2.
51. See id.
52. See Jill R. Aitoro, IBM Suspended from New Federal Contracts, GOV’T EXEC. (Mar.
31, 2008), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0308/033108j1.htm.
53. See Nick Wakeman, GTSI Suspended but Vows to Fight, WASH. TECH. (Oct. 1,
2010), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/10/01/gtsi-fights-sba-charge.aspx.
54. See Dana Hedgpeth & Josh Boak, Nonprofit Cut Off from New U.S. Contracts as It
Faces Investigation, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2010, at A22.
55. Indeed, despite their availability, the article fails to cite to any recent suspension and
debarment statistics, relying solely on statistics that are at least 10-30 years old. See
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 809; see also Council of the Inspectors Gen. on
Integrity & Efficiency, Annual Reports to the President, available at
http://www.ignet.gov/randp/arpt1.html (providing annual suspension and debarment
statistics).
56. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 775.
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contract requirements.57 The immediate debarment of one of these
contractors would leave a monopoly at best, and a vacuum at worst.
Moreover, large contracts with firms like BAE, Lockheed Martin, and
Boeing are critical to maintaining military superiority and basic government
functions. 58 As a result, the debarment regime affords SDOs the flexibility
and discretion necessary to protect the U.S. government’s diverse interests.
The authors advocate for a system in which due process rights are
irrelevant, remediation is a fiction, and the government’s business
partnerships are disposable. However, “[w]ith fewer major, critical
contractors available to compete for the government’s most sophisticated
requirements, it seems disingenuous to bar a key player from future
competition,” simply for the sake of retribution and arbitrary standards of
morality. 59
VI. MORE DEBARMENT ≠ MORE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES
Too Big to Debar also claims that if the government starts debarring
large contractors more frequently, companies will be so scared of potential
debarment that they will voluntarily disclose their potential violations of the
FCPA in hopes of lenient treatment. Citing the Department of Defense’s
Voluntary Disclosure program 60 (a regime that was wiped out nearly four
years ago by the FAR 52.203-13 Mandatory Disclosure rules 61) as evidence
of such potential leniency, the article contends that “[b]y debarring
companies in egregious, highly public cases of foreign corruption, federal
prosecutors can leverage the escalated level of risk associated with
debarment to incentivize more companies to come forward in exchange for
leniency.” 62 The idea that companies will be more likely to come forward
in a system where debarment is used more frequently as a tool of
punishment defies logic. Hinging a company’s fate not on its remedial
measures or present responsibility, but on some subjective (and likely
57. Many major weapons systems and components were dual-sourced until the early
1990s, when, in an effort to save money, the Department of Defense aggressively embarked
upon an effort to consolidate the defense industrial base. See John Deutch, Consolidation of
the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, ACQUISITION REV. Q., Fall 2001, at 137–38, available at
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic706688.files/Consolidation_of_the_US_Defense_In
dustrial_Base.pdf.
58. See generally Steven S. Schooner & Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on
Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, J. OF CONT. MGMT., Sept.
2008.
59. Schooner, supra note 29, at 214.
60. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 809 n.243.
61. The authors surprisingly cite to the defunct Department of Defense Voluntary
Disclosure Program as support for one of their arguments. The new mandatory disclosure
rules were a “sea change” in procurement law, requiring, among other things, the mandatory
disclosure of potential violations of the law, the adoption of stringent internal controls and
ethics programs, and new grounds for suspension and debarment for failure to comply with
the mandatory disclosure requirements. See FAR Case 2007-006, Contractor Business Ethics
Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,064 (Nov. 12, 2008) (to
be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 3, 9, 42, and 52). Notably, potential violations of the FCPA
are not expressly required under this regime.
62. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 809.
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politically motivated) determination that a case is “egregious,” would deter
any major company from coming forward for fear that their familiar name
and U.S. government business would result in their death sentence.
Contrary to the authors’ claims, it would give contractors an “incentive to
stonewall, deny problems exist, and not make changes for fear of potential
liability that would result in a mandatory debarment regardless of their
willingness to change.” 63
CONCLUSION
Ignoring the glaring factual errors, selective quotes, and incorrect
assumptions, Too Big to Debar appears to assert that it is morally wrong to
“reward” government contractors that have misbehaved. By injecting
theories of morality and punishment into an administrative regime, the
article elevates the simple, almost visceral desire for large-scale retribution
over the more nuanced best interests of the government.
While there are instances in which corporate misconduct is so egregious,
pervasive, and untreatable that debarment may be appropriate, this nuclear
sanction should not be utilized simply because it is politically popular. By
discounting the actual consequences of debarment, while artificially
amplifying its impact on FCPA deterrence, the authors fail to observe a
trend that has been occurring over the last few years. As companies adapt
to the new era of FCPA enforcement, large and successful government
contractors already have sophisticated compliance and internal controls in
place. 64 The companies pilloried in the article have already spent
substantial sums of money overhauling their FCPA compliance programs—
both in response to their own FCPA violations and by observing the
violations committed by others. More importantly, putting the philosophy
aside, in an era of outsourced government, these large, sophisticated firms
permit governments to serve the populations they govern. 65
Too Big to Debar follows a well-trodden populist track by vilifying and
bashing contractors without regard for nuance or reality. Experts
understand that there is a surefire method for ensuring that there will be no
fraud in government contracting: simply stop awarding contracts. Then
governments can place their trust directly in politicians and public officials
who, as history has proven time and time again, are insulated from
temptation, immune to missteps, and endlessly toil with the public’s best
interest at heart. If that solution does not set your mind at ease, maybe it is
time to return to a more thoughtful, reasoned analysis of this complex,
challenging issue.

63. Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 5.
64. In fact, most of the largest government contractors voluntarily belong to
organizations dedicated solely to the promotion of ethical compliance programs and culture.
See, e.g., DII Member Companies 2009–2010, DEF. INDUS. INITIATIVE,
http://www.dii.org/our-companies (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
65. See generally Schooner & Greenspahn, supra note 58.

